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Store closures and channel shifts: the lessons the record supports

A public retailer's closure record would show how to sequence a move to online. The material available here cannot supply that case, so this draft works from what it can document.

Retailers that move sales from shop floors to screens usually plan the online channel first and the closures second. This piece was meant to show how one public retailer sequenced that move. The material supplied for it does not allow that. It holds no annual report, investor disclosure or closure announcement from a listed retailer, so the closure programme, the order in which stores went and the way customers moved to other channels cannot be documented here. What the pack does hold is a run of Australian retail failures, two American studies of showrooming and the Office for National Statistics' retail series. Read carefully, that material still teaches something about channel shifts. It cannot stand in for the case.

  1. 2010

    Phones enter the aisle

    Wharton Knowledge reports that InsightExpress, of Stamford, Connecticut, found 40 per cent of smartphone owners used their phones to find a better price in store. That was the baseline the firm measured against the following year.

  2. 2011

    Showrooming becomes a majority habit

    According to the same Wharton Knowledge article, InsightExpress found 59 per cent of smartphone owners used their phones to find a better price in store in 2011. Retailers planning a channel shift had to assume that comparison was now routine.

  3. 2019

    Shoppers still prefer the store

    Monash Business School IMPACT reports that the 2019 Australian Consumer and Retail Studies survey found 71 per cent of Australian consumers like to shop at physical stores always or most of the time. The same preference that keeps stores open is the one a closure plan must respect.

  4. H1 FY20

    A group reports earnings recovery

    Monash IMPACT says Mosaic Brands, which owns Noni B, Rockmans and Millers, had underlying earnings likely up 36 per cent in the first half of FY20, around $32 million. The article gives no account of how the group's store estate changed over the same period.

  5. Early 2020

    Closures are earmarked

    Monash IMPACT reports that more than 300 stores were earmarked for closure in Australia in the first months of 2020. The source does not say which retailers held those stores, or in what order they were to close.

The decision that mattered

The sharpest lesson in the pack concerns a promise, not a door. Monash Business School IMPACT cites Jeanswest's click-and-collect service as one of its downfalls. The service was ready only three to seven days after purchase. A shopper who wanted an item quickly was being offered a delay, and the store was competing with retailers that offered faster collection. The article does not say whether the company tried to shorten that delay before its collapse, and nothing else in the pack says so either. The gap between what a channel promises and what it delivers is where a channel shift usually fails, and the pack gives one clear example of it.

The same article makes a point about range. It says Bardot suffered from an unclear range that mixed night-out and corporate-chic lines, which left customers unsure the store was for them. A store that cannot say who it serves will struggle to decide what to stock, which channel to push and what a shopper should do when she arrives. The article also cites Zara as a benchmark for click-and-collect and returns policy, and notes its change-room limit of 10 items. A named competitor with published policies gives a retailer something concrete to measure against. Guessing at what good looks like is the weaker option.

The explanations for the failures disagree. According to Monash IMPACT, KPMG blamed Jeanswest's collapse on tough market conditions and pressure from online competition. Dr Eloise Zoppos of Monash Business School rejects that account as the whole story. She says the closures are not due solely to online shopping, and she frames the period as a turnover of retail leaders rather than an apocalypse. The source gives no way to reconcile the two views. A board reading either one should ask which of them would have changed a decision the company actually faced, and which would have changed only the headline.

The pack says nothing about customer migration. It does not record whether shoppers from a closed Australian store moved to a nearby branch, to a website or to a competitor. It does not show whether the remaining stores gained or lost trade after a closure. Any plan that assumes customers will simply shift to online is resting on an assumption the sources do not test. Treat that as an open question to answer with the retailer's own data, not as a finding.

Where the shopper goes

The US evidence in the pack approaches the same problem from the other side. Wharton Knowledge, summarising research, reports that 59 per cent of smartphone owners used their phones to find a better price in store in 2011, up from 40 per cent in 2010, according to InsightExpress. A separate comScore finding, also reported by Wharton Knowledge, says nearly six in 10 shoppers who went into a store but bought later online had meant to buy in the store. The shopper was in the building and intended to buy there. The sale went elsewhere.

The categories most exposed were consumer electronics, then apparel, clothing and accessories, according to comScore as reported by Wharton Knowledge. A study by KeyBanc Capital Markets, also described in that article, found Amazon's consumer-electronics prices 11 per cent below Walmart stores and 8 per cent below Best Buy. The comparison included New York, where Amazon charges sales tax. A store that sells the same product at a higher shelf price loses the comparison, whatever its service levels. A retailer planning a shift should look first at the categories where this comparison is quickest to make.

Retailers have responded in different ways. Wharton Knowledge reports that Walmart stopped selling Amazon Kindle devices, and that Target did the same earlier that year. Best Buy replaced some standard barcodes with chain-specific ones, which blocks quick online price checks. Hoch of Wharton says the CD and DVD categories have contracted so far that Best Buy is left with unproductive space. Adner of Dartmouth's Tuck School argues that efforts to block outside information will fail, because consumers cannot be locked in. Blocking is a tactic, and the pack gives no evidence that it changed the outcome for the retailers that tried it.

Lessons

  • Test the online promise against the store's own fulfilment before it goes into a plan. Jeanswest's click-and-collect was ready only three to seven days after purchase, and Monash IMPACT cites that as one of its downfalls.
  • Define the customer each surviving store serves before you choose which stores stay. Monash IMPACT says Bardot's mixed range left customers unsure the store was for them.
  • Price the showroom into the plan. Wharton Knowledge, citing InsightExpress and comScore, reports that in-store comparison was widespread by 2011, and consumer electronics was the most exposed category in comScore's data.
  • Do not treat blocking outside information as a strategy. Adner of Dartmouth's Tuck School argues that such efforts will fail, and the Best Buy barcode change is a tactic, not a plan.
  • Use the three success factors Zoppos names as a checklist for the surviving estate: an in-store experience worth the trip, a clear target-customer offering and joined-up omnichannel integration. Monash IMPACT reports these factors without tying them to a closure outcome.

A smaller company can borrow the habits in this list. It can write its online promise as a measurable service time, check its range against a named customer and price its most comparable categories against the shelf it expects a shopper to see. It can also borrow the discipline of testing a single-cause explanation, as Zoppos's objection to KPMG's account invites. What does not transfer is the scale. The Best Buy barcode change, the Walmart and Target device decisions and the KeyBanc price gap all rest on the purchasing power and reach of very large chains. A company with a handful of stores cannot copy those moves and should not try. The Office for National Statistics publishes internet sales in GB by store type, by month and year, and its first estimate for July to September 2026 shows retail sales rising in value and volume. The extract gives no figures for the store-type series, so a board should pull that dataset itself and compare its own channel mix with the sector. Before any closure is approved, the retailer's annual reports and closure notices should be read in full. A tax adviser or lawyer should review any lease exit, redundancy cost or lender consent, because the sources say nothing about those matters.

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