What a strategy office does, and whether your company needs one
A strategy office can sharpen the big choices a board faces, or become an expensive second opinion. Here is how to decide, and how to set its mandate, team and reporting line.
A strategy office is a small team at the centre of a company, reporting to the chief executive or the chair, whose work is to prepare the big choices before they reach the board and to check that they are carried through. It is not a planning department that writes a long document every autumn, and it is not a standing consultancy. Whether it earns its keep depends less on the talent in the room than on the decisions it is asked to make, and on who it answers to.
How it works
In our experience the work falls into three kinds. The office frames decisions: it turns a vague worry about a market or a division into a question, with options and a date by which the board must answer it. It prepares analysis: it builds the case for or against each option, usually alongside the finance team rather than in competition with it. And it follows up: it keeps a record of what the board decided, what the company expected to happen, and whether that happened. The third kind is the one most often dropped, and it is the one that tells a board whether the office is doing anything useful.
The work has a rhythm. Some of it is reactive, answering a question that arrives with a deadline attached, such as an approach to buy a business or a proposal to enter a new market. Some of it is scheduled, such as a review of each division's position ahead of the budget round. The better offices keep the scheduled work short and leave room for the reactive work, because the reactive questions are the ones where a board needs a second opinion fastest.
The office does not own a profit and loss account. That is its defining feature and its main source of friction. Business unit heads run their own numbers, and they resent a small team that questions those numbers without carrying any of the risk. The office therefore needs authority borrowed from the chief executive, and that authority is only as good as the chief executive's willingness to use it. A strategy office with no visible sponsor soon becomes a library of unread slides.
A useful test is to ask what the office changed in the last twelve months. Name three decisions it shaped, and say how. If the answer is a list of documents, the office is describing its output, not its effect. Good answers are specific: a capital request withdrawn, a division given a narrower brief, an acquisition priced differently from the first draft. These are judgement tests rather than measures, and they are imperfect, but they are harder to fake than headcount.
Who it affects
The question matters most in companies with several business units, a steady flow of acquisitions or disposals, or decisions that cut across divisions and have no single owner. A company with one product line and one plant can usually make its strategic choices in the chief executive's diary and the finance lead's spreadsheet. Adding a team there tends to create a second layer of opinion without a second source of information.
Three groups feel the office most directly. The first is the finance lead, whose working relationship with the office will decide whether the two sides agree on the numbers. The second is the divisional heads, who will read every paper the office writes as a judgement on their own performance unless the mandate says otherwise. The third is the chair and the non-executive directors, who receive its output and need to know whether it is an independent view or a restatement of management's preferred answer.
Founder-led and family-owned companies need particular care. An office reporting to a founder can become the place where a preference is given the form of analysis. That is not a comment on any founder's intentions. It is a structural risk, and the reporting line and the published mandate exist to reduce it. The question to ask is simple: if the office's recommendation disagreed with the founder's stated view, would that recommendation still reach the board unchanged?
What leaders get wrong
- They hire before they write the mandate, and then let the first analyst define the job.
- They fund studies without tying them to a decision the board has to take this year.
- They place the office under one executive, so it becomes that executive's staff under a different name.
- They let it grow into a second finance department, with its own models and its own version of the numbers.
- They judge it by the length of its output rather than by the decisions it changed.
Most of these errors share a cause. The office was set up to answer a general wish for better strategy, not a specific problem the board could name. Once that wish becomes the brief, every study looks useful and none of them matters enough to change a vote.
A quieter error is to treat the office as the place where difficult questions go to be handled politely. When a divisional plan is weak, the easy move is to send it to the strategy team for review and let the delay do the work. An office used this way gets a reputation for slowness, and the business units stop bringing it anything they care about.
What to do about it
Start with the decisions, not the team. Write down the five or so choices the board is likely to face in the coming year: capital, acquisitions, entry to or exit from a market, and large changes to pricing or supply. For each one, say who currently prepares the analysis, and whether that person has the time and the standing to challenge the sponsor. Where the honest answer is nobody, you have found the first mandate.
Write the mandate on a single page. It should say what the office decides on its own, what it recommends to the chief executive, and what it refuses to do. The refusal list is the part most companies skip. An office that will not run a business unit's budget, will not approve a hire, and will not rewrite a divisional plan without the divisional head present is an office that will be trusted with the rest.
Keep the first team small and mixed. A sensible starting point is a lead with enough seniority to argue with a divisional managing director, one analyst who can build a model without close supervision, and access to finance staff on loan for specific pieces of work. Hire for judgement and clear writing over sector knowledge, since the office will be asked to examine businesses it does not yet understand. Be wary of a senior outside consultant as permanent lead, unless the board is ready to treat that person's view as the house view.
Before anything is hired, agree the first three questions the office will answer and the date each answer is due to the board. Three is enough. A first year that begins with a list of ten topics usually ends with ten half-finished papers and a board that has stopped reading them. Choose the questions the chief executive already has to answer, and let the office take them off the agenda.
The chief executive is the usual reporting line, and for good reason: the office needs a sponsor with the authority to end a debate. But the chair should see the office's written recommendations on any decision the board reserves to itself, at the same time as management. This is less a formal reporting line than a rule about what reaches the board unedited. Where the chief executive also chairs, the independent directors should agree that rule in writing before the first paper goes out.
Review the office once a year against the test above. Ask which decisions it changed, which it failed to influence, and how much of its effort went on work nobody used. If the answers stay thin for two years running, shrink the team or close it, and move its remaining work back to finance and the business units. Closing a strategy office is not a failure. Keeping one that changes nothing is an expense that looks like strategy.
Whether your company needs one comes down to a plain question. Are there choices in the next year that matter, that cut across the business, and that nobody currently owns the analysis for? If the answer is yes, a small office with a narrow mandate and a clear line to the board is a reasonable experiment. If the answer is no, the money is better spent making the existing finance and operating teams sharper, and the chief executive's time is better spent on the decisions themselves.


